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ABSTRACT
The Sparse Vector Technique (SVT) is a fundamental technique for
satisfying differential privacy and has the unique quality that one
can output some query answers without apparently paying any pri-
vacy cost. SVT has been used in both the interactive setting, where
one tries to answer a sequence of queries that are not known ahead
of the time, and in the non-interactive setting, where all queries are
known. Because of the potential savings on privacy budget, many
variants for SVT have been proposed and employed in privacy-
preserving data mining and publishing. However, most variants of
SVT are actually not private. In this paper, we analyze these errors
and identify the misunderstandings that likely contribute to them.
We also propose a new version of SVT that provides better utility,
and introduce an effective technique to improve the performance of
SVT. These enhancements can be applied to improve utility in the
interactive setting. Through both analytical and experimental com-
parisons, we show that, in the non-interactive setting (but not the
interactive setting), the SVT technique is unnecessary, as it can be
replaced by the Exponential Mechanism (EM) with better accuracy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy (DP) is increasingly being considered the
privacy notion of choice for privacy-preserving data analysis and
publishing in the research literature. In this paper we study the
Sparse Vector Technique (SVT), a basic technique for satisfying
DP, which was first proposed by Dwork et al. [7] and later refined
in [16] and [12], and used in [11, 13, 18, 1, 17]. Compared with
other techniques for satisfying DP, SVT has the unique quality that
one can output some query answers without apparently paying any
privacy cost. More specifically, in SVT one is given a sequence
of queries and a certain threshold T , and outputs a vector indicat-
ing whether each query answer is above or below T ; that is, the
output is a vector {⊥,⊤}ℓ, where ℓ is the number of queries an-
swered, ⊤ indicates that the corresponding query answer is above
the threshold, and ⊥ indicates below. SVT works by first perturb-
ing the threshold T and then comparing each perturbed individual
query answer against the noisy threshold. When one expects that
the predominant majority of queries are on one side, e.g., below the
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threshold, one can use SVT so that while each output of ⊤ (which
we call a positive outcome) consumes some privacy budget, each
output of ⊥ (negative outcome) consumes none. That is, with a
fixed privacy budget and a given level of noise added to each query
answer, one can keep answering queries as long as the number of
⊤’s does not exceed a pre-defined cutoff point.
This ability to avoid using any privacy budget for queries with
negative outcomes is very powerful for the interactive setting,
where one answers a sequence of queries without knowing ahead
of the time what these queries are. Some well-known lower-bound
results [3, 5, 6, 10] suggest that “one cannot answer a linear, in the
database size, number of queries with small noise while preserving
privacy” [7]. This limitation can be bypassed using SVT, as in the
iterative construction approach in [11, 12, 16]. In this approach,
one maintains a history of past queries and answers. For each new
query, one first uses this history to derive an answer for the query,
and then uses SVT to check whether the error of this derived an-
swer is below a threshold. If it is, then one can use this derived
answer for this new query without consuming any privacy budget.
Only when the error of this derived answer is above the threshold,
would one need to spend privacy budget accessing the database to
answer the query.
With the power of SVT come the subtlety of why it is private
and the difficulty of applying it correctly. The version of SVT used
in [11, 12], which was abstracted into a generic technique and de-
scribed in Roth’s 2011 lecture notes [15], turned out to be not dif-
ferentially private as claimed. This error in [11, 12] is arguably not
critical because it is possible to use a fixed version of SVT without
affecting the main asymptotic results. Since 2014, several vari-
ants of SVT were developed; they were used for frequent itemset
mining [13], for feature selection in private classification [18], and
for publishing high-dimensional data [1]. These usages are in the
non-interactive setting, where all the queries are known ahead of
the time, and the goal is to find c queries that have large answers,
e.g., finding the c most frequent itemsets. Unfortunately, these vari-
ants do not satisfy DP, as pointed out in [2]. When using a correct
version of SVT in these papers, one would get significantly worse
accuracy. Since these papers seek to improve the tradeoff between
privacy and utility, the results in them are thus invalid.
The fact that many usages of SVT are not private, even when
proofs of their privacy were given, is already known [2, 20]; how-
ever, we feel that what led to the erroneous proofs were not clearly
explained, and such an explanation can help researchers to avoid
similar errors in the future. One evidence of the continuing con-
fusion over SVT appears in [2], the first paper that identifies er-
rors in some SVT variants. In [2], the SVT variants in [13, 18, 1]
were modeled as a generalized private threshold testing algorithm
(GPTT), and a proof showing that GPTT does not satisfy ǫ-DP for
any finite ǫ (which we use∞-DP to denote in this paper) was given.
However, as we show in this paper, the proof in [2] was incorrect.
This error was not reported in the literature. One goal of this paper
is to clearly explain why correct usages of SVT is private, and what
are the most likely confusions that caused the myriad of incorrect
usages of SVT.
A second goal of this paper is to improve the accuracy of SVT.
A version of SVT with a correct privacy proof appeared in Dwork
and Roth’s 2014 book [8], and was used in some recent work, e.g.,
[17]. In this paper, we present a version of SVT that adds less noise
for the same level of privacy. In addition, we develop a novel tech-
nique that optimizes the privacy budget allocation between that for
perturbing the threshold and that for perturbing the query answers,
and experimentally demonstrate its effectiveness.
A third goal of this paper is to point out that usage of SVT can
be replaced by the Exponential Mechanism (EM) [14] when used
in the non-interactive setting. Most recent usages of SVT in [1, 13,
17, 18] are in the non-interactive setting, where the goal is to select
up to c queries with the highest answers. In this setting, one could
also use the Exponential Mechanism (EM) [14] c times to achieve
the same objective, each time selecting the query with the highest
answer. Using analysis as well as experiments, we demonstrate that
EM outperforms SVT.
In summary, this paper has the following novel contributions.
1. We propose a new version of SVT that provides better utility.
We also introduce an effective technique to improve the per-
formance of SVT. These enhancements achieve better utility
than previous SVT algorithms and can be applied to improve
utility in the interactive setting.
2. While previous papers have pointed out most of the errors
in usages of SVT, we use a detailed privacy proof of SVT
to identify the misunderstandings that likely caused the dif-
ferent non-private versions. We also point out a previously
unknown error in the proof in [2] of the non-privacy of some
SVT variants.
3. Through analysis and experiments on real datasets, we have
evaluated the effects of various SVT optimizations and com-
pared them to EM. Our results show that for non-interactive
settings, one should use EM instead of SVT.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives
background information on DP. We analyze six variants of SVT in
Section 3. In Section 4, we present our optimizations of SVT. We
compare SVT with the exponential mechanism in Section 5. The
experimental results are shown in Section 6. Related works are
summarized in Section 7. Section 8 concludes our work.
2. BACKGROUND
DEFINITION 1 (ǫ-DP [4, 5]). A randomized mechanism A
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy (ǫ-DP) if for any pair of neighbor-
ing datasets D and D′, and any S ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(D) = S] ≤ eǫ · Pr
[
A(D′) = S
]
.
Typically, two datasets D and D′ are considered to be neighbors
when they differ by only one tuple. We use D ≃ D′ to denote this.
There are several primitives for satisfying ǫ-DP. The Laplacian
mechanism [5] adds a random noise sampled from the Laplace dis-
tribution with the scale parameter proportional to ∆f , the global
sensitivity of the function f . That is, to compute f on a dataset D,
one outputs
Af (D) = f(D) + Lap
(
∆f
ǫ
)
,
where ∆f = max
D≃D′
|f(D) − f(D′)|,
and Pr[Lap (β) = x] = 1
2β
e−|x|/β.
In the above, Lap (β) denotes a random variable sampled from the
Laplace distribution with scale parameter β.
The exponential mechanism [14] samples the output of the data
analysis mechanism according to an exponential distribution. The
mechanism relies on a quality function q : D×R→ R that assigns
a real valued score to one output r ∈ R when the input dataset is
D, where higher scores indicate more desirable outputs. Given the
quality function q, its global sensitivity ∆q is defined as:
∆q = max
r
max
D≃D′
|q(D, r)− q(D′, r)|.
Outputting r using the following distribution satisfies ǫ-DP:
Pr[r is selected] ∝ exp
(
ǫ
2∆q
q(D, r)
)
.
In some cases, the changes of all quality values are one-
directional. For example, this is the case when the quality function
counts the number of tuples that satisfy a certain condition, and two
datasets are considered to be neighboring when one is resulted from
adding or deleting a tuple from the other. When adding one tuple,
all quality values either stay unchanged or increase by one; the sit-
uation where one quality increases by 1 and another decreases by
1 cannot occur. In this case, one can make more accurate selection
by choosing each possible output with probability proportional to
exp
(
ǫ
∆q
q(D, r)
)
, instead of exp
(
ǫ
2∆q
q(D, r)
)
.
DP is sequentially composable in the sense that combining mul-
tiple mechanisms A1, · · · ,Am that satisfy DP for ǫ1, · · · , ǫm re-
sults in a mechanism that satisfies ǫ-DP for ǫ =
∑
i ǫi. Because of
this, we refer to ǫ as the privacy budget of a privacy-preserving data
analysis task. When a task involves multiple steps, each step uses a
portion of ǫ so that the sum of these portions is no more than ǫ.
3. VARIANTS OF SVT
In this section, we analyze variants of SVT; six of them are listed
in Figure 1. Alg. 1 is an instantiation of our proposed SVT. Alg. 2
is the version taken from [8]. Alg. 3, 4, 5, and 6 are taken from [15,
13, 18, 1] respectively.
The table in Figure 2 summarizes the differences among these
algorithms. Their privacy properties are given in the last row of the
table. Alg. 1 and 2 satisfy ǫ-DP, and the rest of them do not. Alg. 3,
5, 6 do not satisfy ǫ-DP for any finite ǫ, which we denote as ∞-DP.
An important input parameter to any SVT algorithm is the num-
ber c, i.e., how many positive outcomes one can answer before stop-
ping. This number can be quite large. For example, in privately
finding top-c frequent itemsets [13], c ranges from 50 to 400. In
using selective stochastic gradient descent to train deep learning
model privately [17], the number of gradients to upload at each
epoch ranges from 15 to 140,106.
To understand the differences between these variants, one can
view SVT as having the following four steps steps:
1. Generate the threshold noise ρ (Line 1 in each algorithm),
which will be added to the threshold during comparison be-
tween each query and the threshold (line 5). In all except
Alg. 2, ρ scales with ∆/ǫ1. In Alg. 2, however, ρ scales with
c∆/ǫ1. This extra factor of c in the noise scale causes Alg. 2
Figure 1: A Selection of SVT Variants
Input/Output shared by all SVT Algorithms
Input: A private database D, a stream of queries Q = q1, q2, · · · each with sensitivity no more than ∆, either a sequence of thresholds
T = T1, T2, · · · or a single threshold T (see footnote ∗), and c, the maximum number of queries to be answered with ⊤.
Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · · , where each ai ∈ {⊤,⊥} ∪ R and R denotes the set of all real numbers.
Algorithm 1 An instantiation of the SVT proposed in this paper.
Input: D,Q,∆,T = T1, T2, · · · , c.
1: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1)
2: ǫ2 = ǫ − ǫ1, count = 0
3: for each query qi ∈ Q do
4: νi = Lap (2c∆/ǫ2)
5: if qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + ρ then
6: Output ai = ⊤
7: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
8: else
9: Output ai = ⊥
Algorithm 2 SVT in Dwork and Roth 2014 [8].
Input: D,Q,∆, T, c.
1: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (c∆/ǫ1)
2: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1, count = 0
3: for each query qi ∈ Q do
4: νi = Lap (2c∆/ǫ1)
5: if qi(D) + νi ≥ T + ρ then
6: Output ai = ⊤, ρ = Lap (c∆/ǫ2)
7: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
8: else
9: Output ai = ⊥
Algorithm 3 SVT in Roth’s 2011 Lecture Notes [15].
Input: D,Q,∆, T, c.
1: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1),
2: ǫ2 = ǫ − ǫ1, count = 0
3: for each query qi ∈ Q do
4: νi = Lap (c∆/ǫ2)
5: if qi(D) + νi ≥ T + ρ then
6: Output ai = qi(D) + νi
7: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
8: else
9: Output ai = ⊥
Algorithm 4 SVT in Lee and Clifton 2014 [13].
Input: D,Q,∆, T, c.
1: ǫ1 = ǫ/4, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1)
2: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1, count = 0
3: for each query qi ∈ Q do
4: νi = Lap (∆/ǫ2)
5: if qi(D) + νi ≥ T + ρ then
6: Output ai = ⊤
7: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
8: else
9: Output ai = ⊥
Algorithm 5 SVT in Stoddard et al. 2014 [18].
Input: D,Q,∆, T .
1: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1)
2: ǫ2 = ǫ − ǫ1
3: for each query qi ∈ Q do
4: νi = 0
5: if qi(D) + νi ≥ T + ρ then
6: Output ai = ⊤
7:
8: else
9: Output ai = ⊥
Algorithm 6 SVT in Chen et al. 2015 [1].
Input: D,Q,∆,T = T1, T2, · · · .
1: ǫ1 = ǫ/2, ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1)
2: ǫ2 = ǫ− ǫ1
3: for each query qi ∈ Q do
4: νi = Lap (∆/ǫ2)
5: if qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + ρ then
6: Output ai = ⊤
7:
8: else
9: Output ai = ⊥
Alg. 1 Alg. 2 Alg. 3 Alg. 4 Alg. 5 Alg. 6
ǫ1 ǫ/2 ǫ/2 ǫ/2 ǫ/4 ǫ/2 ǫ/2
Scale of threshold noise ρ ∆/ǫ1 c∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ1
Reset ρ after each output of ⊤ (unnecessary) Yes
Scale of query noise νi 2c∆/ǫ2 2c∆/ǫ2 c∆/ǫ1 ∆/ǫ2 0 ∆/ǫ2
Outputting qi + νi instead of ⊤ (not private) Yes
Outputting unbounded ⊤’s (not private) Yes Yes
Privacy Property ǫ-DP ǫ-DP ∞-DP
(
1+6c
4
ǫ
)
-DP ∞-DP ∞-DP
Figure 2: Differences among Algorithms 1-6.
∗ Algorithms 1 and 6 use a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · , allowing different thresholds for different queries. The other
algorithms use the same threshold T for all queries. We point out that this difference is mostly syntactical. In fact, having an SVT where
the threshold always equals 0 suffices. Given a sequence of queries q1, q2, · · · , and a sequence of thresholds T = T1, T2, · · · , we can
define a new sequence of queries ri = qi − Ti, and apply the SVT to ri using 0 as the threshold to obtain the same result. In this paper,
we decide to use thresholds to be consistent with the existing papers.
to be much less accurate than Alg. 1. We show that includ-
ing the factor of c is an effect of Alg. 2’s design to resample
ρ each time a query results in a positive outcome (Line 6).
When keeping ρ unchanged, ρ does not need to scale with c
to achieve privacy.
2. For each query qi, generate noise νi to be added to the query
(Line 4), which should scale with 2c∆/ǫ2. In Alg. 4 and
6, νi scales with ∆/ǫ2. Removing the factor of c from the
magnitude of the noise will result in better utility; however,
this is done at the cost of being non-private. Alg. 5 adds no
noise to qi at all, and is also non-private.
3. Compare the perturbed query answer with the noisy thresh-
old and output whether it is above or below the threshold
(Lines 5, 6, 9). Here Alg. 1 differs in that it outputs the noisy
query answer qi(D) + νi, instead of an indicator ⊤. This
makes it non-private.
4. Keep track of the number of⊤’s in the output, and stop when
one has outputted c ⊤’s (Line 7). This step is missed in
Alg. 5 and 6. Without this limitation, one can answer as
many queries as there are with a fixed accuracy level for each
query. If this was to be private, then one obtains privacy kind
of “for free”.
3.1 Privacy Proof for Alg. 1
We now prove the privacy of Alg. 1. We break down the proof
into two steps, to make the proof easier to understand, and, more
importantly, to enable us to point out what confusions likely cause
the different non-private variants of SVT to be proposed. In the
first step, we analyze the situation where the output is⊥ℓ, a length-
ℓ vector 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉, indicating that all ℓ queries are tested to be
below the threshold.
LEMMA 1. Let A be Alg. 1. For any neighboring datasets D
and D′, and any integer ℓ, we have
Pr
[
A(D) = ⊥ℓ
]
≤ eǫ1Pr
[
A(D′) = ⊥ℓ
]
.
PROOF. We have
Pr
[
A(D) = ⊥ℓ
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z] fD(z) dz,
where fD(z) = Pr
[
A(D) = ⊥ℓ | ρ = z
]
(1)
=
∏
i∈{1,2,··· ,ℓ}
Pr[qi(D) + νi < Ti + z] . (2)
The probability of outputting ⊥ℓ over D is the summation (or inte-
gral) of the product of Pr[ρ = z], the probability that the threshold
noise equals z, and fD(z), the conditional probability that ⊥ℓ is
the output on D given that the threshold noise ρ is z. The step from
(1) to (2) is because, given D, T, the queries, and ρ, whether one
query results in ⊥ or not depends completely on the noise νi and is
independent from whether any other query results in ⊥.
The key observation underlying the SVT technique is that for
any neighboring D,D′, we have fD(z) ≤ fD′(z + ∆). Sup-
pose that we have qi(D) = qi(D′)−∆ for each qi, then the ratio
fD(z)/fD′(z) is unbounded when |L| is unbounded. However,
fD(z) is upper-bounded by the case where the dataset is D′ but
the noisy threshold is increased by ∆, because for any query qi,
|qi(D) − qi(D
′)| ≤ ∆. More precisely, we have
Pr[qi(D) + νi < Ti + z] = Pr[νi < Ti − qi(D) + z]
≤ Pr
[
νi < Ti +∆− qi(D
′) + z
]
= Pr
[
qi(D
′) + νi < Ti + (z +∆)
]
. (3)
Because ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1), by the property of the Laplace distribu-
tion, we have:
∀z, Pr[ρ = z] ≤ eǫ1 Pr[ρ = z +∆] , and thus
Pr
[
A(D) = ⊥ℓ
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z] fD(z) dz
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
eǫ1Pr[ρ = z +∆] fD′(z +∆) dz
= eǫ1
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr
[
ρ = z′
]
fD′(z
′) dz′ let z′ = z +∆
= eǫ1Pr
[
A(D′) = ⊥ℓ
]
.
This proves the lemma.
We can obtain a similar result when the output is ⊤ℓ instead
of ⊥ℓ, i.e., Pr
[
A(D) = ⊤ℓ
]
≤ eǫ1Pr
[
A(D′) = ⊤ℓ
]
, because
Pr[ρ = z] ≤ eǫ1 Pr[ρ = z −∆] and gD(z) ≤ gD′(z−∆), where
gD(z) =
∏
i
Pr[qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + z] . (4)
The fact that this bounding technique works both for positive
outputs and negative outputs likely contributes to the misunder-
standings behind Alg. 5 and 6, which treat positive and negative
outputs exactly the same way. The error is that when the output
consists of both ⊥ and ⊤, one has to choose one side (either posi-
tive or negative) to be bounded by the above technique, and cannot
do both at the same time.
We also observe that the proof of Lemma 1 will go through if no
noise is added to the query answers, i.e., νi = 0, because Eq (3)
holds even when νi = 0. It is likely because of this observation that
Alg. 5 adds no noise to query answers. However, when consider-
ing outcomes that include both positive answers (⊤’s) and negative
answers (⊥’s), one has to add noises to the query answers, as we
show below.
THEOREM 2. Alg. 1 is ǫ-DP.
PROOF. Consider any output vector a ∈ {⊥,⊤}ℓ. Let a =
〈a1, · · · , aℓ〉, I⊤ = {i : ai = ⊤}, and I⊥ = {i : ai = ⊥}.
Clearly, |I⊤| ≤ c. We have
Pr[A(D) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z) gD(z) dz, (5)
where fD(z) =
∏
i∈I⊥
Pr[qi(D)+νi<Ti+z]
and gD(z) =
∏
i∈I⊤
Pr[qi(D)+νi≥Ti+z] .
The following, together with ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2, prove this theorem:
Pr[ρ=z] ≤ eǫ1Pr[ρ=z +∆]
fD(z) ≤ fD′(z +∆) (6)
gD(z) ≤ e
ǫ2gD′(z +∆). (7)
Eq. (6) deals with all the negative outcomes. Eq. (7), which deals
with positive outcomes, is ensured by several factors. At most
c positive outcomes can occur, |qi(D) − qi(D′)| ≤ ∆, and the
threshold for D′ is just ∆ higher that for D; thus adding noise
νi = Lap (2c∆/ǫ2) to each query ensures the desired bound. More
precisely,
gD(z) =
∏
i∈I⊤
Pr[νi ≥ Ti+z−qi(D)]
≤
∏
i∈I⊤
Pr
[
νi ≥ Ti+z −∆− qi(D
′)
] (8)
≤
∏
i∈I⊤
eǫ2/cPr
[
νi ≥ Ti+z−∆−qi(D
′)+2∆
] (9)
≤ eǫ2
∏
i∈I⊤
Pr
[
qi(D
′) + νi ≥ Ti + z +∆
] (10)
= eǫ2gD′(z +∆).
Eq. (8) is because−qi(D) ≥−∆−qi(D′), Eq. (9) is from the Laplace
distribution’s property, and Eq. (10) is because there are at most c
positive outcomes, i.e., |I⊤| ≤ c.
We observe that while gD(z) ≤ gD′(z−∆) is true, replacing (7)
with it does not help us prove anything, because (6) uses (z + ∆)
and (7) uses (z−∆), and we cannot change the integration variable
in a consistent way.
3.2 Privacy Properties of Other Variants
Alg. 2 is taken from the differential privacy book published in
2014 [8]. It satisfies ǫ-DP. It has two differences when compared
with Alg. 1. First, ρ follows Lap (c∆/ǫ1) instead of Lap (∆/ǫ1).
This causes Alg. 2 to have significantly worse performance than
Alg. 1, as we show in Section 6. Second, Alg. 2 refreshes the noisy
threshold T after each output of⊤. We note that making the thresh-
old noise scale with c is necessary for privacy only if one refreshes
the threshold noise after each output of⊤; however, such refreshing
is unnecessary.
Alg. 3 is taken from [15], which in turn was abstracted from the
algorithms used in [11, 12]. It has two differences from Alg. 1.
First, νi follows Lap (c∆/ǫ2) instead of Lap (2c∆/ǫ1); this is not
enough for ǫ-DP (even though it suffices for 3ǫ
2
-DP). Second, it
actually outputs the noisy query answer instead of ⊤ for a query
above the threshold. This latter fact causes Alg. 3 to be not ǫ′-DP
for any finite ǫ′. A proof for this appeared in Appendix A of [20];
we omit it here because of space limitation. The error in the proof
for Alg. 3’s privacy in [15] occurs in the following steps:
Pr[A(D) = a]
=
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z)
∏
i∈I⊤
Pr[qi(D)+νi≥T+z ∧ qi(D)+νi=ai] dz
=
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z)
∏
i∈I⊤
Pr[qi(D)+νi = ai] dz (11)
≤
∫
∞
−∞
eǫ1Pr[ρ=z +∆] fD′ (z +∆) dz
∏
i∈I⊤
eǫ2/cPr
[
qi(D
′) + νi = ai
]
The error occurs when going to (11), which is implicitly done
in [15]. This step removes the condition qi(D)+νi ≥ T+z.
Another way to look at this error is that outputting the posi-
tive query answers reveals information about the noisy threshold,
since the noisy threshold must be below the outputted query an-
swer. Once information about the noisy threshold is leaked, the
ability to answer each negative query “for free” disappears.
Alg. 4, taken from [13], differs from Alg. 1 in the following ways.
First, it sets ǫ1 to be ǫ/4 instead of ǫ/2. This has no impact on the
privacy. Second, νi does not scale with c. As a result, Alg. 4 is
only
(
1+6c
4
)
ǫ-DP in general. In [13], Alg. 4 is applied for finding
frequent itemsets, where the queries are counting queries and are
monotonic. Because of this monotonicity, the usage of Alg. 4 here
is
(
1+3c
4
)
ǫ-DP. Theorem 4 can be applied to Alg. 4 to establish this
privacy property; we thus omit the proof of this.
Alg. 6, taken from [1], was motivated by the observation that the
proof in [13] can go through without stopping after encountering c
positive outcomes, and removed this limitation.
Alg 5, taken from [18], further used the observation that the deriva-
tion of Lemma 1 does not depend on the addition of noises, and
removed that part as well. The proofs for Alg. 4, 5, 6 in [13, 18, 1]
roughly use the logic below.
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z)gD(z)dz ≤ e
ǫ
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD′ (z)gD′ (z)dz
because
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z) dz ≤ e
ǫ/2
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD′ (z) dz
and
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] gD(z) dz ≤ e
ǫ/2
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] gD′ (z),
This logic incorrectly assumes the following is true:
∫ ∞
−∞
p(z)f(z)g(z)dz =
∫ ∞
−∞
p(z)f(z)dz
∫ ∞
−∞
p(z)g(z)dz
A proof that Alg. 6 does not satisfy ǫ-DP for any finite ǫ is given
in Appendix B of [20]. While these proofs also apply to Alg. 5, we
give a much simpler proof of this below.
THEOREM 3. Alg. 5 is not ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′.
PROOF. Consider a simple example, with T = 0, ∆ = 1, q =
〈q1, q2〉 such that q(D) = 〈0, 1〉 and q(D′) = 〈1, 0〉, and a =
〈⊥,⊤〉. Then by Eq (5), we have
Pr[A(D) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z]Pr[0 < z]Pr[1 ≥ z] dz
=
∫ 1
0
Pr[ρ = z] dz > 0,
which is nonzero; and
Pr
[
A(D′) = a
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr
[
ρ = z′
]
Pr
[
1 < z′
]
Pr
[
0 ≥ z′
]
dz′,
which is zero. So the probability ratio Pr[A(D)=a]
Pr[A(D′)=a]
=∞.
3.3 Error in Privacy Analysis of GPTT
In [2], the SVT variants in [13, 18, 1] were modeled as a gen-
eralized private threshold testing algorithm (GPTT). In GPTT, the
threshold T is perturbed using ρ = Lap (∆/ǫ1) and each query
answer is perturbed using Lap (∆/ǫ2) and there is no cutoff; thus
GPTT can be viewed as a generalization of Algorithm 6. When
setting ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ2 , GPTT becomes Alg. 6.
There is a constructive proof in [2] to show that GPTT is not
ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′. However, this proof is incorrect. This er-
ror is quite subtle. We discovered the error only after observing
that the technique of the proof can be applied to show that Alg. 1
(which we have proved to be private) to be non-private. The de-
tailed discussion of this error is quite technical, and is included in
Appendix 10.3.
3.4 Other Variants
Some usages of SVT aim at satisfying (ǫ, δ)-DP [5], instead of
ǫ-DP. These often exploit the advanced composition theorem for
DP [9], which states that applying k instances of ǫ-DP algorithms
satisfies (ǫ′, δ′)-DP, where ǫ′ =
√
2k ln(1/δ′)ǫ + kǫ(eǫ − 1). In
this paper, we limit our attention to SVT variants to those satisfying
ǫ-DP, which are what have been used in the data mining commu-
nity [1, 13, 17, 18].
The SVT used in [12, 16] has another difference from Alg. 3.
In [12, 16], the goal of using SVT is to determine whether the error
of using an answer derived from past queries/answers is below a
threshold. This check takes the form of “if |q˜i − qi(D) + νi| ≥
T + ρ then output i,” where q˜i gives the estimated answer of
a query obtained using past queries/answers, and qi(D) gives the
true answer. This is incorrect because the noise νi should be out-
side the absolute value sign. In the usage in [12, 16], the left hand
of the comparison is always ≥ 0; thus whenever the output in-
cludes at least one ⊤, one immediately knows that the threshold
noise ρ≥−T . This leakage of ρ is somewhat similar to Alg. 3’s
leakage caused by outputting noisy query answers that are found to
be above the noisy threshold. This problem can be fixed by using
“if |q˜i−qi(D)|+νi ≥ T +ρ then output i” instead. By viewing
ri = |q˜i − qi(D)| as the query to be answered; this becomes a
standard application of SVT.
4. OPTIMIZING SVT
Alg. 1 can be viewed as allocating half of the privacy budget
for perturbing the threshold and half for perturbing the query an-
swers. This allocation is somewhat arbitrary, and other allocations
are possible. Indeed, Alg. 4 uses a ratio of 1 : 3 instead of 1 : 1.
In this section, we study how to improve SVT by optimizing this
allocation ratio and by introducing other techniques.
4.1 A Generalized SVT Algorithm
We present a generalized SVT algorithm in Alg. 7, which uses
ǫ1 to perturb the threshold and ǫ2 to perturb the query answers.
Furthermore, to accommodate the situations where one wants the
noisy counts for positive queries, we also use ǫ3 to output query
answers using the Laplace mechanism.
Algorithm 7 Our Proposed Standard SVT
Input: D,Q,∆,T = T1, T2, · · · , c and ǫ1, ǫ2 and ǫ3.
Output: A stream of answers a1, a2, · · ·
1: ρ = Lap
(
∆
ǫ1
)
, count = 0
2: for Each query qi ∈ Q do
3: νi = Lap
(
2c∆
ǫ2
)
4: if qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + ρ then
5: if ǫ3 > 0 then
6: Output ai = qi(D) + Lap
(
c∆
ǫ3
)
7: else
8: Output ai = ⊤
9: count = count + 1, Abort if count ≥ c.
10: else
11: Output ai = ⊥
We now prove the privacy for Alg. 7; the proof requires only
minor changes from the proof of Theorem 2.
THEOREM 4. Alg. 7 is (ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ3)-DP.
PROOF. Alg. 7 can be divided into two phases, the first phase
outputs a vector to mark which query is above the threshold and the
second phase uses the Laplace mechanism to output noisy counts
for the queries that are found to be above the threshold in the first
phase. Since the second phase is ǫ3-DP, it suffices to show that the
first phase is (ǫ1+ ǫ2)-DP. For any output vector a ∈ {⊤,⊥}ℓ, we
want to show
Pr[A(D) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z) gD(z) dz
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
eǫ1+ǫ2Pr[ρ=z +∆] fD′(z +∆) gD′(z +∆) dz
= eǫ1+ǫ2Pr
[
A(D′) = a
]
.
This holds because, similarly to the proof of Theorem 2,
Pr[ρ=z] ≤ eǫ1Pr[ρ=z +∆] ,
fD(z) =
∏
i∈I⊥
Pr[qi(D)+νi<Ti+z] ≤ fD′(z +∆),
gD(z) =
∏
i∈I⊤
Pr[qi(D)+νi≥Ti+z] ≤ e
ǫ2gD′(z +∆).
4.2 Optimizing Privacy Budget Allocation
In Alg. 7, one needs to decide how to divide up a total privacy
budget ǫ into ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3. We note that ǫ1 + ǫ2 is used for outputting
the indicator vector, and ǫ3 is used for outputting the noisy counts
for queries found to be above the threshold; thus the ratio of (ǫ1 +
ǫ2) : ǫ3 is determined by the domain needs and should be an input
to the algorithm.
On the other hand, the ratio of ǫ1 : ǫ2 affects the accuracy of
SVT. Most variants use 1 : 1, without a clear justification. To
choose a ratio that can be justified, we observe that this ratio affects
the accuracy of the following comparison:
qi(D) + Lap
(
2c∆
ǫ2
)
≥ T + Lap
(
∆
ǫ1
)
.
To make this comparison as accurate as possible, we want to min-
imize the variance of Lap
(
∆
ǫ1
)
− Lap
(
2c∆
ǫ2
)
, which is
2
(
∆
ǫ1
)2
+ 2
(
2c∆
ǫ2
)2
,
when ǫ1 + ǫ2 is fixed. This is minimized when
ǫ1 : ǫ2 = 1 : (2c)
2/3. (12)
We will evaluate the improvement resulted from this optimization
in Section 6.
4.3 SVT for Monotonic Queries
In some usages of SVT, the queries are monotonic. That is, when
changing from D to D′, all queries whose answers are different
change in the same direction, i.e., there do not exist qi, qj such that
(qi(D) > qi(D
′)) ∧ (qj(D) < qj(D
′)). That is, we have either
∀i qi(D) ≥ qi(D
′), or ∀i qi(D
′) ≥ qi(D). This is the case when
using SVT for frequent itemset mining in [13] with neighboring
datasets defined as adding or removing one tuple. For monotonic
queries, adding Lap
(
c∆
ǫ2
)
instead of Lap
(
2c∆
ǫ2
)
suffices for pri-
vacy.
THEOREM 5. Alg. 7 with νi = Lap
(
c∆
ǫ2
)
in line 3 satisfies
(ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ3)-DP when all queries are monotonic.
PROOF. Because the second phase of Alg. 7 is still ǫ3-DP, we
just need to show that for any output vector a,
Pr[A(D) = a] =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z) gD(z) dz
≤ eǫ1+ǫ2Pr
[
A(D′) = a
]
,
where fD(z) =
∏
i∈I⊥
Pr[qi(D)+νi<Ti+z] ,
and gD(z) =
∏
i∈I⊤
Pr[qi(D)+νi≥Ti+z] .
It suffices to show that either Pr[ρ=z]fD(z)gD(z) ≤
eǫ1+ǫ2Pr[ρ=z] fD′(z)gD′(z), or Pr[ρ=z] fD(z)gD(z) ≤
eǫ1+ǫ2Pr[ρ=z +∆] fD′(z +∆)gD′(z +∆).
First consider the case that qi(D) ≥ qi(D′) for any query qi. In
this case, we have
Pr[qi(D) + νi < Ti + z] ≤ Pr
[
qi(D
′) + νi < Ti + z
]
,
and thus fD(z) ≤ fD′(z). Note that qi(D) − qi(D′) ≤
∆. Therefore, gD(z) ≤ eǫ2gD′(z), without increasing the
noisy threshold by ∆, because Pr[qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + z] ≤
Pr[qi(D
′) + νi ≥ Ti + z −∆] ≤ e
ǫ2
c Pr[qi(D
′) + νi ≥ Ti + z]
since νi = Lap
(
c∆
ǫ2
)
.
Then consider the case in which qi(D) ≤ qi(D′) for any query
qi. We have the usual
fD(z) ≤ fD′(z +∆),
and Pr[ρ=z] ≤ eǫ1Pr[ρ=z +∆] ,
as in previous proofs. With the constraint qi(D) ≤ qi(D′), using
νi = Lap
(
c∆
ǫ2
)
suffices to ensure that Pr[qi(D) + νi ≥ Ti + z] ≤
e
ǫ2
c Pr[qi(D
′) + νi ≥ Ti +∆+ z]. Thus gD(z) ≤ eǫ2gD′(z + ∆)
holds.
For monotonic queries, the optimization of privacy budget allo-
cation (12) becomes ǫ1 : ǫ2 = 1 : c2/3.
5. SVT VERSUS EM
We now discuss the application of SVT in the non-interactive
setting, where all the queries are known ahead of the time. We
note that most recent usages of SVT, e.g., [1, 13, 17, 18, 19], are
in the non-interactive setting. Furthermore, these applications of
SVT aim at selecting up to c queries with the highest answers.
In [13], SVT is applied to find the c most frequent itemsets, where
the queries are the supports for the itemsets. In [1], the goal of us-
ing SVT is to determine the structure of a Bayesian Network that
preserves as much information of the dataset as possible. To this
end, they select attribute groups that are highly correlated and cre-
ate edges for such groups in the network. While the algorithm in [1]
takes the form of selecting attribute groups with score above a cer-
tain threshold, the real goal is to select the groups with the highest
scores. In [17], SVT is used to select parameters to be shared when
trying to learn neural-network models in a private fashion. Once se-
lected, noises are added to these parameters before they are shared.
The selection step aims at selecting the parameters with the highest
scores.
EM or SVT. In non-interactive setting, one can also use the Ex-
ponential Mechanism (EM) [14] to achieve the same objective of
selecting the top c queries. More specifically, one runs EM c times,
each round with privacy budget ǫ
c
. The quality for each query is its
answer; thus each query is selected with probability proportion to
exp
(
ǫ
2c∆
)
in the general case and to exp
(
ǫ
c∆
)
in the monotonic
case. After one query is selected, it is removed from the pool of
candidate queries for the remaining rounds.
An intriguing question is which of SVT and EM offers higher
accuracy. Theorem 3.24 in [8] regarding the utility of SVT with
c = ∆ = 1 states: For any sequence of k queries f1, . . . , fk such
that |{i < k : fi(D) ≥ T − α}| = 0 (i.e. the only query close
to being above threshold is possibly the last one), SVT is (α, β)
accurate (meaning that with probability at least 1 − β, all queries
with answer below T − α result in ⊥ and all queries with answers
above T − α result in ⊤) for: αSVT = 8(log k + log(2/β))/ǫ.
In the case where the last query is at least T + α, being (α, β)-
correct ensures that with probability at least 1−β, the correct selec-
tion is made. For the same setting, we say that EM is (α, β)-correct
if given k − 1 queries with answer ≤ T − α and one query with
answer ≥ T + α, the correct selection is made with probability
at least 1 − β. The probability of selecting the query with answer
≥ T + α is at least e
ǫ(T+α)/2
(k−1)eǫ(T−α)/2+eǫ(T+α)/2
by the definition of
EM. To ensure this probability is at least 1− β,
αEM = (log(k − 1) + log((1− β)/β))/ǫ,
which is less than 1/8 of the αSVT, which suggests that EM is more
accurate than SVT.
The above analysis relies on assuming that the first k−1 queries
are no more than T − α. When that is not assumed, it is difficult
analyze the utility of either SVT or EM. Therefore, we will use
experimental methods to compare SVT with EM.
SVT with Retraversal. We want to find the most optimized ver-
sion of SVT to compare with EM, and note that another interest-
ing parameter that one can tune when applying SVT is that of the
threshold T . When T is high, the algorithm may select fewer than
c queries after traversing all queries. Since roughly each selected
query consumes 1
c
’th of the privacy budget, outputting few than c
queries kind of “wasted” the remaining privacy budget. When T
is low, however, the algorithm may have selected c queries before
encountering later queries. No matter how large some of these later
query answers are, they cannot be selected.
We observe that in the non-interactive setting, there is a way to
deal with this challenge. One can use a higher threshold T , and
when the algorithm runs out of queries before finding c above-
threshold queries, one can retraverse the list of queries that have
not been selected so far, until c queries are selected. However, it
is unclear how to select the optimal threshold. In our experiments,
we consider SVT-ReTr, which increases the threshold T by differ-
ent multiples of the scale factor of the Laplace noise injected to
each query, and applies the retraversal technique.
6. EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally compare the different versions
of the SVT algorithm, including our proposed SVT algorithm with
different privacy budget allocation methods. We also compare the
SVT variants applicable in the non-interactive setting with EM.
Utility Measures. Since the goal of applying SVT or EM is to
select the top queries, one standard metric is False negative rate
(FNR), i.e., the fraction of true top-c queries that are missed. When
an algorithm outputs exactly c results, the FNR is the same as the
False Positive Rate, the fraction of incorrectly selected queries.
The FNR metric has some limitations. First, missing the highest
query will be penalized the same as missing the c-th one. Second,
selecting a query with a very low score will be penalized the same
as selecting the (c + 1)-th query, whose score may be quite close
to the c’th query. We thus use another metric that we call Score
Error Rate (SER), which measures the ratio of “missed scores” by
selecting S instead of the true top c queries, denoted by Topc.
SER = 1.0−
avgScore(S)
avgScore(Topc)
.
We present results for both FNR and SER and observe that the
correlation between them is quite stable.
Datasets. The performance of different algorithms would be af-
fected by the distribution of query scores, we thus want to evaluate
the algorithms on several representative distributions. In the exper-
iments, we use the item frequencies in three real datasets: BMS-
POS, Kosarak and AOL as representative distributions of query
scores. In addition, we also use the distribution inspired by the
Zipf’s law, which states that given some corpus of natural language
Dataset Number of Records Number of Items
BMS-POS 515,597 1,657
Kosarak 990,002 41,270
AOL 647,377 2,290,685
Zipf 1,000,000 10,000
Table 1: Dataset characteristics
Settings Methods Description
Interactive SVT-DPBook DPBook SVT (Alg. 2).SVT-S Standard SVT (Alg. 7).
Non-interactive SVT-ReTr Standard SVT with Retraversal.EM Exponential Mechanism.
Table 2: Summary of algorithms
utterances, the frequency of any word is inversely proportional to
its rank in the frequency table. Similar phenomenon occurs in many
other rankings unrelated to language, such as the population ranks
of cities in various countries, corporation sizes, income rankings,
ranks of number of people watching the same TV channel, and so
on. In this distribution, the i’th query has a score proportional to
1
i
. The characteristics of these datasets are summarized in Table 1,
and the distribution of the 300 highest scores are shown in Figure 3.
Evaluation Setup. We consider the following algorithms. SVT-
DPBook is from Dwork and Roth’s 2014 book [8] (Alg. 2). SVT-S
is our proposed standard SVT, i.e., Alg. 7 without numerical out-
puts (ǫ3 = 0); and since the count query is monotonic, we use
the version for monotonic queries in Section 4.3. We consider four
privacy budget allocations, 1:1, 1:3, 1:c and 1:c2/3, where the last
is what our analysis suggests for the monotonic case. These algo-
rithms can be applied in both the interactive and the non-interactive
setting.
For the non-interactive setting, we consider EM and SVT-ReTr,
which is SVT with the optimizations of increasing the threshold
and retraversing through the queries (items) until c of them are se-
lected. We fix the privacy budget allocation to be 1 : c2/3 and
vary the amount we increase the threshold from 1D, 2D, . . ., to 5D,
where 1D means adding one standard deviation of the added noises
to the threshold.
We vary c from 25 to 300, and each time uses the average score
for the c’th query and the c+1’th query as the threshold. We show
results for privacy budget ǫ = 0.1 in the paper. We omit results
for other ǫ values because of space limitation. We note that vary-
ing c have a similar impact of varying ǫ, since the accuracy of each
method is mostly affect by ǫ
c
; therefore the impact of different ǫ can
be seen from different c values. We run each experiment 100 times,
each time randomizing the order of items to be examined. We re-
port the average and standard deviation of SER. All algorithms are
implemented in Python 2.7 and all the experiments are conducted
on an Intel Core i7-3770 3.40GHz PC with 16GB memory.
Results in the Interactive Setting. Figure 4 reports the results for
the algorithms that can be applied in the interactive setting. While
it is clear that in some settings (such as when c = 25) all methods
are quite accurate, and in some other settings all methods are very
inaccurate (such as when c ≥ 100 for the Zipf dataset), in the
settings in between the two extremes, the differences between these
methods are quite large.
SVT-DPBook performs the worst, followed by SVT-S-1:1, then
by SVT-S-1:3, and finally by SVT-S-1:c and SVT-S-1:c23. The
differences among these algorithms can be quite pronounced. For
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Figure 3: The distribution of 300 highest scores from experi-
ment datasets.
example, on the Kosarak dataset, with ǫ = 0.1, c = 50, SVT-
DPBook’s SER is 0.705, which means that the average support of
selected items is only around 30% of that for the true top-50 items,
which we interpret to mean that the output is meaningless. In con-
trast, all four SVT-S algorithms have SER less than 0.05, suggest-
ing high accuracy in the selection. SVT-DPBook’s poor perfor-
mance is due to the fact that the threshold is perturbed by a noise
with scale as large as c∆/ǫ.
For the differences among the four budget allocation approaches,
it appears that the performance of 1 : c and 1 : c
2
3 are clearly better
than the others; and their advantages over the standard 1 : 1 alloca-
tion is quite pronounced. Which of 1 : c and 1 : c 23 is better is less
clear. In general, the former is better for larger c values, where the
error is higher, and the latter is better for smaller c values, where the
error is lower. Also note that 1 : c results in a significantly larger
standard deviation. For these reasons, we interpret the results as
supporting the recommendation of using 1:c2/3 budget allocation.
Results in the Non-interactive Setting. Figure 5 reports the re-
sults for the algorithms that can be applied in the noninteractive
setting. We observe that EM clearly performs better than SVT-
ReTr-1:c23, which performs essentially the same as SVT-S-1:c23,
which is the best algorithm for the interactive case, and is already
much better than SVT algorithms used in the literature. For exam-
ple, for the AOL dataset with c = 150, EM’s SER is 0.15, while
SVT-S with 1 : c2/3 allocation has SER of 0.59, and SVT-S with
1 : 1 allocation has SER of 0.99.
It is interesting to see that increasing the threshold can signifi-
cantly improve the accuracy of SVT with Retraversal. However,
the best threshold increment value depends on the dataset and the
number of items to be selected. For example, 5D works well for
Zipf, and for Kosarak and AOL when c is large, but works not as
well for BMS and for Kosarak and AOL when c is small. Since
it is unclear how to select the best threshold increment value, and
even with the best threshold increment, SVT-ReTr performs no bet-
ter than EM, our experiments suggest that usage of SVT should be
replaced by EM in the non-interactive setting.
7. RELATED WORK
SVT was introduced by Dwork et al. [7], and improved by Roth
and Roughgarden [16] and by Hardt and Rothblum [12]. These
usages are in an interactive setting. An early description of SVT as
a stand-alone technique appeared in Roth’s 2011 lecture notes [15],
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Figure 4: Comparison of interactive approaches: SVT-DPBook and SVT-S with different budget allocation. Privacy budget ǫ = 0.1.
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Figure 5: Comparison of non-interactive approaches: EM and SVT-ReTr with different thresholds. Privacy budget ǫ = 0.1. x-axis:
top-c.
which is Alg. 3 in this paper, and is in fact ∞-DP. The algorithms
in [16, 12] also has another difference, as discussed in Section 3.4.
Another version of SVT appeared in the 2014 book [8], which is
Alg. 2. This version is used in some papers, e.g., [17]. We show
that it is possible to add less noise and obtain higher accuracy for
the same privacy parameter.
Lee and Clifton [13] used a variant of SVT (see Algorithm 4)
to find itemsets whose support is above the threshold. Stoddard
et al. [18] proposed another variant (see Algorithm 5) for private
feature selection for classification to pick out the set of features
with scores greater than the perturbed threshold. Chen et al. [1]
employed yet another variant of SVT (see Algorithm 6) to return
attribute pairs with mutual information greater than the correspond-
ing noisy threshold. These usages are not private. Some of these
errors were pointed in [2], in which a generalized private threshold
testing algorithm (GPTT) that attempts to model the SVT variants
in [13, 18, 1] was introduced. The authors showed that GPTT did
not satisfy ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′. But there is an error in the proof,
as shown in Section 3.3. Independent from our work, Zhang et al.
[20] presented two proofs that the variant of SVT violates DP with-
out discussing the cause of the errors. Also presented in [20] is a
special case of our proposed Alg. 1 for counting queries. To our
knowledge, the general version of our improved SVT (Alg. 1 and
Alg. 7), the techniques of optimizing budget allocation, the tech-
nique of using re-traversal to improve SVT, and the comparison of
SVT and EM are new in our work.
8. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a new version of SVT that provides better
utility. We also introduce an effective technique to improve the
performance of SVT by optimizing the distribution of privacy bud-
get. These enhancements achieve better utility than the state of
the art SVT and can be applied to improve utility in the interactive
setting. We have also explained the misunderstandings and errors
in a number of papers that use or analyze SVT; and believe that
these will help clarify the misunderstandings regarding SVT and
help avoid similar errors in the future. We have also shown that in
the non-interactive setting, EM should be preferred over SVT.
9. REFERENCES
[1] R. Chen, Q. Xiao, Y. Zhang, and J. Xu. Differentially private
high-dimensional data publication via sampling-based
inference. In KDD, pages 129–138, 2015.
[2] Y. Chen and A. Machanavajjhala. On the privacy properties
of variants on the sparse vector technique. CoRR,
abs/1508.07306, 2015.
[3] I. Dinur and K. Nissim. Revealing information while
preserving privacy. In PODS, pages 202–210, 2003.
[4] C. Dwork. Differential privacy. In ICALP, pages 1–12, 2006.
[5] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith.
Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. In
TCC, pages 265–284, 2006.
[6] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, and K. Talwar. The price of privacy
and the limits of LP decoding. In STOC, pages 85–94, 2007.
[7] C. Dwork, M. Naor, O. Reingold, G. Rothblum, and
S. Vadhan. On the complexity of differentially private data
release: efficient algorithms and hardness results. STOC,
pages 381–390, 2009.
[8] C. Dwork and A. Roth. The algorithmic foundations of
differential privacy. Theoretical Computer Science,
9(3-4):211–407, 2013.
[9] C. Dwork, G. N. Rothblum, and S. Vadhan. Boosting and
differential privacy. FOCS ’10, pages 51–60, 2010.
[10] C. Dwork and S. Yekhanin. New efficient attacks on
statistical disclosure control mechanisms. CRYPTO’08,
pages 469–480, 2008.
[11] A. Gupta, A. Roth, and J. Ullman. Iterative constructions and
private data release. In TCC, pages 339–356, 2012.
[12] M. Hardt and G. N. Rothblum. A multiplicative weights
mechanism for privacy-preserving data analysis. In FOCS,
pages 61–70, 2010.
[13] J. Lee and C. W. Clifton. Top-k frequent itemsets via
differentially private fp-trees. In KDD ’14, pages 931–940,
2014.
[14] F. McSherry and K. Talwar. Mechanism design via
differential privacy. In FOCS, pages 94–103, 2007.
[15] A. Roth. The sparse vector technique, 2011. Lecture notes
for “ The Algorithmic Foundations of Data Privacy”.
[16] A. Roth and T. Roughgarden. Interactive privacy via the
median mechanism. In STOC, pages 765–774, 2010.
[17] R. Shokri and V. Shmatikov. Privacy-preserving deep
learning. In CCS, pages 1310–1321, 2015.
[18] B. Stoddard, Y. Chen, and A. Machanavajjhala.
Differentially private algorithms for empirical machine
learning. CoRR, abs/1411.5428, 2014.
[19] J. Zhang, G. Cormode, C. M. Procopiuc, D. Srivastava, and
X. Xiao. Privbayes: Private data release via bayesian
networks. In SIGMOD ’14, pages 1423–1434, 2014.
[20] J. Zhang, X. Xiao, and X. Xie. Privtree: A differentially
private algorithm for hierarchical decompositions. SIGMOD
’16, pages 155–170, 2016.
10. APPENDIX
10.1 Proof that Alg. 3 is non-private
THEOREM 6. Alg. 3 is not ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′.
PROOF. Set c = 1 for simplicity. Given any finite ǫ′ > 0, we
construct an example to show that Alg. 3 is not ǫ′-DP. Consider
an example with T = 0, and m + 1 queries q with sensitivity ∆
such that q(D) = 0m∆ and q(D′) = ∆m0, and the output vector
a = ⊥m0, that is, only the last query answer is a numeric value 0.
Let A be Alg. 3. We show that Pr[A(D)=a]
Pr[A(D′)=a]
≥ eǫ
′ for any ǫ′ > 0
when m is large enough.
We denote the cumulative distribution function of Lap
(
2∆
ǫ
)
by
F (x). We have
Pr[A(D) = a]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z)Pr[∆+νm+1≥z ∧∆+νm+1=0] dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z)Pr[0 ≥ z]Pr[νm+1 = −∆] dz
=
ǫ
4∆
e−
ǫ
2
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z)Pr[0 ≥ z] dz
=
ǫ
4∆
e−
ǫ
2
∫ 0
−∞
Pr[ρ=z] fD(z) dz
=
ǫ
4∆
e−
ǫ
2
∫ 0
−∞
Pr[ρ = z]
m∏
i=1
Pr[νi < z] dz
=
ǫ
4∆
e−
ǫ
2
∫ 0
−∞
Pr[ρ = z] (F (z))m dz, (13)
and similarly
Pr
[
A(D′) = a
]
=
ǫ
4∆
∫ 0
−∞
Pr
[
ρ = z′
]
(F (z′ −∆))m dz′. (14)
The fact that 0 is given as an output reveals the information that
the noisy threshold is at most 0, forcing the range of integration to
be from−∞ to 0, instead of from−∞ to∞. This prevents the use
of changing z in (13) to z′ −∆ to bound the ratio of (13) to (14).
Noting that F (z)
F (z−∆)
= e
ǫ
2 for any z ≤ 0, we thus have
Pr[A(D) = a]
Pr[A(D′) = a]
= e−
ǫ
2
∫ 0
−∞ Pr[ρ = z] (F (z))
m dz∫ 0
−∞ Pr[ρ = z
′] (F (z′ −∆))m dz′
= e−
ǫ
2
∫ 0
−∞
Pr[ρ = z] (e
ǫ
2 F (z −∆))m dz∫ 0
−∞ Pr[ρ = z
′] (F (z′ −∆))m dz′
= e(m−1)
ǫ
2 ,
and thus when m > ⌈ 2ǫ
′
ǫ
⌉ + 1, we have Pr[A(D)=a]
Pr[A(D′)=a]
> eǫ
′
.
10.2 Proof that Alg. 6 is non-private
THEOREM 7. Alg. 6 is not ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′.
PROOF. We construct a counterexample with ∆ = 1, T = 0,
and 2m queries such that q(D) = 02m, and q(D′) = 1m(−1)m.
Consider the output vector a = ⊥m⊤m. Denote the cumulative
distribution function of νi by F (x). From Eq. (5), we have
Pr[A(D) = a]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z]
m∏
i=1
Pr[0+νi < z]
2m∏
i=m+1
Pr[0+νi ≥ z] dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z] (F (z)(1 − F (z)))m dz,
and
Pr
[
A(D′) = a
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z]
m∏
i=1
Pr[1+νi < z]
2m∏
i=m+1
Pr[−1+νi ≥ z] dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z] (F (z − 1)(1 − F (z+1)))m dz.
We now show that Pr[A(D)=a]
Pr[A(D′)=a]
is unbounded as m increases, prov-
ing this theorem. Compare F (z)(1 − F (z)) with F (z − 1)(1 −
F (z+1)). Note that F (z) is monotonically increasing. When
z ≤ 0,
F (z)(1− F (z))
F (z − 1)(1 − F (z+1))
≥
F (z)
F (z − 1)
=
1
2
e
ǫ
2
z
1
2
e
ǫ
2
(z−1)
= e
ǫ
2 .
When z > 0, we also have
F (z)(1− F (z))
F (z − 1)(1 − F (z+1))
≥
1− F (z)
1− F (z + 1)
=
1
2
e−
ǫ
2
z
1
2
e−
ǫ
2
(z+1)
= e
ǫ
2 .
So, Pr[A(D)=a]
Pr[A(D′)=a]
≥ e
mǫ
2 , which is greater than eǫ
′
when m > ⌈ 2ǫ
′
ǫ
⌉
for any finite ǫ′.
10.3 Error of non-privacy proof in [2]
The proof in [2] that GPTT is non-private considers the counter-
example with ∆ = 1, T = 0, a sequence q of 2t queries such that
q(D) = 0t1t and q(D′) = 1t0t, and the output vector a = ⊥t⊤t.
Then
Pr[GPTT(D) = a]
Pr[GPTT(D′) = a]
=
∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z]
(
Fǫ2 (z)−Fǫ2 (z)Fǫ2 (z−1)
)t dz∫
∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z]
(
Fǫ2 (z−1)−Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2 (z−1)
)t dz
where Fǫ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of Lap (1/ǫ) .
The goal of the proof is to show that the above is unbounded as t
increases. A key observation is that the ratio of the integrands of
the two integrals is always larger than 1, i.e.,
κ(z) =
Fǫ2(z)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1)
Fǫ2(z − 1) − Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1)
> 1
For example, since Fǫ(x) is the cumulative distribution function
of Lap (1/ǫ), we have Fǫ2(0) = 1/2 and Fǫ2(−1) < 1/2; and
thus κ(0) = 1−Fǫ2 (−1)
Fǫ2 (−1)
> 1. However, when |z| goes to ∞, κ(z)
goes to 1. Thus the proof tries to limit the integrals to be a finite
interval so that there is a lower-bound for κ(z) that is greater than
1. It denotes α = Pr[GPTT(D′) = a]. Then choose parameter
δ = |F−1ǫ1 (
α
4
)| to use [−δ, δ] as the finite interval, and thus
α ≤ 2
∫ δ
−δ
Pr[ρ = z] (Fǫ2(z − 1) − Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))
t dz.
Denote the minimum of κ(z) in the closed interval [−δ, δ] by κ.
Then we have Pr[GPTT(D)=a]
Pr[GPTT(D′)=a]
> κ
t
2
. The proof claims that for any
ǫ′ > 1 there exists a t to make the above ratio larger than eǫ
′
.
The proof is incorrect because of dependency in the parameters.
First, α is a function of t; and when t increases, α decreases be-
cause the integrand above is positive and decreasing. Second, δ
depends on α, and when α decreases, δ increases. Thus when t
increases, δ increases. We write δ as δ(t) to make the dependency
on t explicit. Third, κ, the minimum value of κ(z) over the interval
[−δ(t), δ(t)], decreases when t increases. That is, κ is also depen-
dent on t, denoted by κ(t), and decreases while t increases. It is
not sure that there exists such a t that κ(t)
t
2
> eǫ
′
for any ǫ′ > 1.
To demonstrate that the error in the proof cannot be easily fixed,
we point out that following the logic of that proof, one can prove
that Alg. 1 is not ǫ′-DP for any finite ǫ′. We now show such a
“proof” that contradicts Lemma 1. Let A be Alg. 1, with c = 1.
Consider an example with ∆ = 1, T = 0, a sequence q of t queries
such that q(D) = 0t and q(D′) = 1t, and output vector a = ⊥t.
Let
β = Pr
[
A(D) = ⊥ℓ
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z]
(
F ǫ
4
(z)
)t
dz
α = Pr
[
A(D′) = ⊥ℓ
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr[ρ = z]
(
F ǫ
4
(z − 1)
)t
dz,
where F ǫ
4
(x) is the cumulative distribution function of Lap
(
4
ǫ
)
.
Find a parameter δ such that
∫ δ
−δ
Pr[ρ = z] dz ≥ 1 − α
2
. Then∫ δ
−δ
Pr[ρ = z]
(
F ǫ
4
(z − 1)
)t
dz ≥ α
2
. Let κ be the minimum
value of
F ǫ
4
(z)
F ǫ
4
(z−1)
in [−δ, δ]; it must be that κ > 1. Then
β >
∫ δ
−δ
Pr[ρ = z]
(
F ǫ
4
(z)
)t
dz ≥
∫ δ
−δ
Pr[ρ = z]
(
κF ǫ
4
(z − 1)
)t
dz
= κt
∫
δ
−δ
Pr[ρ = z]
(
F ǫ
4
(z − 1)
)t
dz ≥
κt
2
α.
Since κ > 1, one can choose a large enough t to make β
α
= κ
t
2
to
be as large as needed. We note that this contradicts Lemma 1. The
contradiction shows that the proof logic used in [2] is incorrect.
